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299 
AUTOMATIC FOR REMOVAL?: THE USE OF 
POST-PETITION EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY FOR 
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Paul had worked as a shipping associate for one of the branches of The 
Boxer Corporation (Boxer). Paul worked there for six years, and Boxer 
promoted him to the position of Branch Shipping Manager. Within one 
month after the promotion, Paul discovered that one of the shipping 
associates, Arthur, was falsifying the weight of many shipments and thus 
overcharging Boxer’s clients. Paul reported the misconduct to the Director of 
Human Resources and continued his normal duties. In the months following 
Paul’s action, his supervisors began to express displeasure with Paul’s 
performance. Three months after Paul reported Arthur, Boxer terminated 
Paul’s employment. 
Paul filed a complaint in state A’s state court, alleging that Boxer violated 
state A’s whistleblowing statute and illegally terminated him in retaliation for 
reporting Arthur. He sought compensatory damages and reinstatement, 
alleging that damages were “in excess of $10,000,” in accordance with state 
A’s rules of procedure. Paul is a citizen of state A. Boxer, however, filed a 
notice of removal to federal court under diversity jurisdiction because Boxer 
is incorporated in state B and has its principal place of business in state B. In 
response, Paul filed a motion for remand, arguing that the amount in 
controversy did not exceed the federal jurisdictional requirement of $75,000. 
The court, at its discretion, determines which evidence may prove the amount 
in controversy because there is no clear rule on whether the court may look 
beyond the notice of removal for evidence to establish the requisite 
jurisdictional amount. 
The previous hypothetical demonstrates the competing interests involved 
in a state case removed to federal court. The venue of a case can greatly 
affect the cost, convenience, and outcome of a case.1 The plaintiff is master 
of the complaint2 and has control over the forum for his action.3 In contrast, 
 
 
 1. For a discussion on the costs and inconvenience of litigation in the federal courts, see infra 
note 174. 
 2. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 492 (1989). 
 3. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1987) (stating that the plaintiff may 
choose the forum, as master of the complaint). For more discussion of the plaintiff as master of the 
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the defendant should have access to federal courts and a trial free from the 
bias of the plaintiff’s home state.4 At the same time, there is a strong 
preference that state courts settle state claims because of issues of federalism 
and efficiency.5  
To understand the different issues involved, one should first examine the 
process of removal. When a plaintiff brings suit in a state court, the case does 
not necessarily remain in state court. Title 28 of the United States Code 
creates the process of removal by which a defendant6 can move a state case 
to a federal court if the court has subject matter jurisdiction.7 Subject matter 
jurisdiction consists of either federal question jurisdiction8 or diversity 
jurisdiction. 9  
However, neither Title 28 nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state 
the manner in which the parties must establish the amount in controversy 
requirement for diversity jurisdiction.10 All courts examine the plaintiff’s 
pleadings for an allegation of an amount in excess of the minimum 
jurisdictional requirement,11 but the plaintiff’s complaint in state court is 
usually ambiguous and does not allege a specific amount.12 Without an 
established method of determining this amount, the courts must apply their 
discretion. 
 
 
complaint, see infra  note 142 and accompanying text. 
 4. See S. REP.  NO. 106-420, at 11 (2000) (stating that state juries are often unfairly biased 
against out-of-state defendants).  
 5. For a discussion on the issues of federalism and efficiency, see infra  notes 143-44 and 
accompanying text. 
 6. Only defendants may file notice of removal, and all defendants must file jointly. 14B 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3723, at 563 (3d ed. 1998). If 
the defendant asserts a counter-claim that would normally trigger federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff, 
though in a defending position, may not remove the case to federal court. Sidney Powell & Deborah 
Pearce-Reggio, The Ins and Outs of Federal Court: A Practitioner’s Guide to Removal and Remand , 
17 MISS. C. L. REV. 227, 230 (1997).  
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994). 
 8. “Federal question” jurisdiction derives from cases that “arise under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. II 1996). See 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3561 (2d ed. 1984). 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. II 1996). For more details on the requirements of diversity 
jurisdiction, see infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
 10. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 185 (1936) (asserting 
that in relation to the amount in controversy, the Act of 1875 “did not prescribe any particular mode in 
which the question of jurisdiction was to be brought to the attention of the court, nor how, when raised, 
it should be determined”); Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in 
Controversy Cannot Be Determined from the Face of Plaintiff’s Complaint: The Need for Judicial and 
Statutory Reform to Preserve Defendant’s Equal Access to Federal Courts, 62 MO. L. REV. 681, 684 
(1997). 
 11. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938) (“[T]he sum 
claimed by the plaintiff controls .  . . .”). 
 12. See infra note 50 for examples of state procedural rules that mandate ambiguous pleadings. 
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The courts follow different approaches to prove the amount in 
controversy,13 and various circuits use completely divergent standards to 
establish the amount. Generally, the circuits follow two different approaches. 
Some circuits look at evidence after the defendant has filed the petition for 
removal.14 Other circuits do not look beyond the defendant’s notice for facts 
establishing the amount in controversy.15 The circuits disagree on the 
defendant’s ability to use evidence established after the petition for removal 
to prove the amount in controversy in diversity cases. None of the circuits’ 
approaches fully address the opposing interests of both the plaintiff, choice of 
venue16—and the defendant, avoiding prejudice.17 At the same time, 
principles of federalism and judicial efficiency mandate that state claims 
remain in state court.18  
An amendment to the removal statute would reconcile the competing 
interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the court system. An amendment 
would clarify how the courts should handle the typical situation in which the 
plaintiff’s complaint does not reveal the amount in controversy in a diversity 
jurisdiction case. This Note proposes an amendment to the removal statute 
that explicitly permits an allegation in good faith to establish the amount in 
controversy.19 
Part II of this Note discusses the background of removal in diversity cases 
and modern circuit court rulings. First, Part II examines the statutes that 
permit the removal of state cases to federal courts. It also discusses how 
several Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directly affect the execution of 
removal and create opposing interests in the removal of cases. Second, Part II 
examines the most important case law that has applied removal principles. 
Part III analyzes the different approaches that the circuits have taken and the 
opposing interests of the parties and the court system.20 Part IV proposes an 
 
 
 13. This Note does not examine the effect of post-removal damage stipulations by the defendant. 
The circuits hold that post-removal stipulations that limit damages to an amount less than the amount 
in controversy do not destroy diversity jurisdiction in federal court. See, e.g., Rogers v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, 230 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 14. For a discussion on the circuit courts that allow post -petition evidence, see infra  notes 103-40 
and accompanying text. 
 15. For a discussion on the circuit courts that strictly prohibit post-petition evidence, see infra 
notes 85-102 and accompanying text. 
 16. For a discussion on the plaintiff’s control of venue as master of the complaint, see  infra  note 
142 and accompanying text. 
 17. For a discussion on the defendant’s right to a trial free from bias, see infra  note 143 and 
accompanying text. 
 18. For a discussion on the reasons why state claims should remain in the state courts, see  infra 
notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
 19. For a discussion on the proposed amendment, see infra  notes 205-23 and accompanying text. 
 20. For an analysis of the circuits’ holdings and the opposing interests involved, see infra notes 
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amendment to the removal statute that effectuates a compromise of the 
different interests within the context of the common law principles applied 
by the circuits in diversity jurisdiction cases. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Legislative Foundation for Diversity Jurisdiction 
In 1948, Congress enacted §§ 1332 and 1441 of Title 28 of the United 
States Code and detailed the basis of federal jurisdiction.21 Section 1332 
establishes the requirements necessary to gain federal diversity jurisdiction.22 
If a plaintiff brings an action in state court, the defendant may still have 
access to the federal court system by the process of removal.23 Section 
1441(a) states that a defendant can remove an action from state court to 
federal court when the federal court has original jurisdiction. 24 Original 
jurisdiction25 requires either federal question jurisdiction26 or diversity 
jurisdiction. 27 Diversity jurisdiction, in turn, requires (1) complete diversity 
 
 
141-204 and accompanying text. 
 21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1948) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States[.]”).   
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. II 1996). The Judiciary Act of 1789 first established the statutory 
basis of lower federal courts. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 142 (2d ed. 
1985). The Judiciary Act of 1789 created districts and circuits, which were the seeds of the modern 
federal system. The Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73. The Judiciary Act 
provided that “original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a 
civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and 
costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars.” Id. at 78. 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides that  “any civil action brought in a State court of which the 
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, [sic] may be removed by the defendant or 
the defendants, to the district court . . . embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(a) (1991). See also  U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, § 2 at 509 (providing for the removal of “any suit of 
a civil nature, . . . of which the circuit courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction . . . and 
which may now be pending . . . in any State court, may be removed by the defendant or defendants 
therein to the circuit court of the United States for the proper district”). The statute further provides 
that when there is “a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different [s]tates . . . then either 
one or more of the defendants . . . may remove said suit into the circuit court of the United States for 
the proper district.” Id. 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994). 
 25. “Original jurisdiction” is a court’s jurisdiction to hear a case first before any other court. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (Bryan A. Garner et al. eds., 7th ed. 1999). See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 
(1994) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States 
have original jurisdiction , may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of 
the United States .  . . .”) (emphasis added).  
 26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (“The district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). 
 27. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (Supp. II 1996) (providing that the federal district courts possess 
original jurisdiction “where the matter in controversy . . . is between—citizens of different States”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/5
p299 Lastimosa book pages.doc  8/5/2002   5:53 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] AUTOMATIC REMOVAL 303 
 
 
 
 
between the plaintiffs and defendants28 and (2) an amount in controversy29 in 
excess30 of the statutory amount, currently $75,000.31 
When Congress first created diversity jurisdiction, $500 fulfilled the 
amount in controversy requirement.32 Since then, Congress has codified 
diversity jurisdiction in Title 28 of the United States Code and repeatedly 
amended the minimum dollar amount required for the amount in 
controversy.33 Congress increased the requisite amount to $2,000 in 1887,34 
to $3,000 in 1911,35 to $10,000 in 1958,36 and to $50,000 in 1988.37 In 1996, 
Congress raised it to the current statutory amount of $75,000.38  
 
 
 28. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (establishing the rule that diversity 
exists when the parties on one side are from different states than the parties on the other side). The 
Supreme Court later specified that “diversity jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a 
citizen of a different State from each plaintiff.” Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 
373 (1978). Co-plaintiffs or co-defendants may be from the same state; opposing parties only need 
diversity from each other. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 292 (3d ed. 1999). If the 
plaintiff is a citizen of a state and the defendant is a citizen of a foreign state, the courts deem them to 
possess complete diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (Supp. II 1996). 
 29. The “amount in controversy” is the total of “damages claimed or relief demanded by the 
injured party in a lawsuit.” BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra  note 25, at 84. 
 30. The case does not qualify for diversity jurisdiction if the amount in controversy is equal to or 
less than $75,000. The amount in controversy must amount to at least $75,000.01. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a) (Supp. II 1996) (providing that the federal courts possess jurisdiction when the “matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000”). 
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (Supp. II 1996).  
 32. The Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
 33. Congress first codified diversity jurisdiction in 1940. 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940). In 1948, 
Congress amended Title 28 to create Title 28’s modern structure. Act of June 25, 1948, § 1, 62 Stat. 
869. 
 34. Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552. 
 35. Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1091. 
 36. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). The 
Committee on the Judiciary believed that the increase would raise the amount in controversy 
requirement to a level that would reduce the federal court workload. S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3 (1958). 
The amount would also allow “all substantial controversies” to have access federal court without 
granting time to “petty controversies.” Id. at 21.  
 37. The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Act of November 19, 1988, § 201, 
Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4646 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). Congress raised the 
amount in controversy to reduce the number of diversity of citizenship cases in the federal courts and 
to factor inflation in the amount. H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 44 (1988). 
 38. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, § 205, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996) 
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). There is not substantial legislative history for the latest increase. 
Taking into account the legislative history of the prior increase, one might surmise that Congress 
wanted to reduce the number of diversity cases in federal court and to factor inflation into the amount. 
14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3701, at 3-4 (3d ed. 
1998). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p299 Lastimosa book pages.doc  8/5/2002   5:53 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
304 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:299 
 
 
 
 
Under § 1446, removal must follow a specific process.39 To remove a 
case from a state court to a federal court,40 the defendant must file a notice of 
removal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.41 The 
notice must contain a “short and plain statement of the grounds for 
removal.”42 The defendant must file the notice within thirty days43 of the 
defendant’s receipt of a copy of the pleading of the action, or within thirty 
days of the service of summons if the pleading has been filed in court and 
need not be served, whichever is shorter.44 If the action is not initially 
removable,45 the defendant may remove within thirty days after the plaintiff 
amends the complaint, but never more than one year after the action 
commences.46 However, the case does not necessarily remain in federal 
court.47 Subsection (4) of § 1446(c) states, “If it clearly appears on the face of 
 
 
 39. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
 40. The case moves to the federal court that “embraces” the original state court. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(a) (1994).  
 41. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1994). Prior to 1948, the removal process followed a different 
procedure. Previously, the defendant filed the notice of removal in state court. Rule 11 details the 
requirements of representations to the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). Notice may consist of “a pleading, written motion, or other paper.” Id. 
 43. Not all courts agree on when to begin counting the thirty-day period for removal. Some 
courts begin counting only after the defendant receives formal service. See, e.g., Love v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. 542 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1982). Other courts begin counting after the defendant 
“otherwise” receives service. See, e.g., Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 44. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994). The courts strictly and narrowly apply the thirty-day deadline. 
See Robert F. Koets, Annotation, What Constitutes “Initial Pleading” for Purposes of Computing 
Time for Removal of Civil Action from State to Federal Court under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1446(b), 130 A.L.R. 
FED. 581 § 2[a], at 590 (1996); 32B AM.  JUR.  2D Federal Practice & Procedure § 2492 (1995) 
(stating that the defendant must strictly comply with the time requirement). If a removal petition 
claims that the defendant received the pleading “on or about” thirty days prior to filing, the district 
court must remand the case because the petition “does not [demonstrate] . . . the requisite certainty” 
that the filing occurred within the thirty-day deadline. Id. Moreover, the courts do not have any 
authority to extend the thirty-day deadline put upon defendants by § 1446. 16 A.L.R. FED. 287 § 2[a], 
at 292 (1996). See, e.g., Dutton v. Moody, 104 F. Supp. 838, 840 (D.C.N.Y. 1952); Youngson v. Lusk, 
96 F. Supp. 285 (D. Neb. 1951).  
 45. The defendant often does not know whether or not the action is removable because of the 
ambiguous pleading. Different courts handle the strict statutory limit of thirty days differently. On one 
hand, some courts begin counting the thirty days after the plaintiff files the complaint because the 
defendant should have ascertained removability from the complaint. See, e.g., Richman v. Zimmer, 
Inc., 644 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Fla. 1986). On the other hand, some courts begin counting the thirty days 
after the defendant has enough evidence to determine removability. See, e.g., Marcel v. Pool Co., 5 
F.3d 81, 84 (5th Cir. 1993); Marler v. Amoco Oil Co., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 656, 659 (E.D.N.C. 1992); 
Cent. Iowa Agri-Sys. v. Old Heritage Adver. and Publishers, 727 F. Supp. 1304, 1305 (S.D. Iowa 
1989).  
 46. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994). 
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c) (Supp. II 1996). 
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the notice . . . that removal should not be permitted, the court shall make an 
order for summary remand.”48 
A plaintiff’s complaint often does not allege damages sufficient to satisfy 
the amount in controversy requirement.49 Many states prohibit alleging 
damages in a specific amount and require an allegation of damages, for 
example, of an amount “in excess of $10,000” for the purposes of 
determining the proper state court.50 In addition, plaintiffs often prefer state 
court to federal court,51 and most plaintiffs do not allege damages large 
 
 
 48. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4) (1994). 
 49. This evidentiary situation manifests itself in two fundamental cases: (1) the “indeterminate” 
complaint, the case in which the plaintiff does not allege a specific amount, and (2) the “lowball” 
complaint, the case in which the plaintiff alleges an amount of damages less than the amount in 
controversy simply to avoid removal. See Noble-Allgire, supra  note 10, at 686. 
 50. Plaintiffs previously alleged an exact amount of damages in the complaint. The amount of 
damages sought determined which division of state court had jurisdiction, such as state district court or 
state superior court. Most states had the same jurisdictional amount of $10,000 as the federal court, 
and thus, defendants could easily establish the amount in controversy from the complaint. While 
Congress increased the amount in controversy requirement, most state legislatures have not increased 
the jurisdictional amount for state courts. Jack E. Karns, Removal to Federal Court and the 
Jurisdictional Amount in Controversy Pursuant to State Statutory Limitations on Pleadin g Damage 
Claims, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1996). In fact, a plaintiff risks dismissal in state court for 
pleading a specific amount in excess of the state requirement. Id. at 1092-93.  Some states require 
allegations of a different amount but follo w a similar pattern. As a result, defendants suffer from the 
setback that plaintiffs only state damages that are sufficient to meet state circuit court jurisdiction. 
Steven L. Brannock & Carol Jean LoCicero, Forum Selection—The Art of Removal and Remand, 63 
FLA. B. J. 45, 46 (1989). Florida courts, for example, require that the complaint allege damages “in 
excess of $15,000” to satisfy their circuit court jurisdictional amount. Charles A. Carlson, Removal to 
Federal Court on the Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction: The “Amount in Controversy” Controversy, 69 
FLA. B. J. 77 (1995). See, e.g., Gaitor v. Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co., 287 F.2d 252, 254-55 (5th 
Cir. 1961) (ruling that remand is proper when the plaintiff’s ambiguous complaint did not establish the 
amount in controversy requirement). In contrast, some states’ rules of civil procedure do not allow a 
plaintiff to allege any amount in the complaint whatsoever. See, e.g., COLO . R. CIV. P . 8(a) (providing 
that in Colorado “[n]o dollar amount shall be stat ed in the prayer or demand for relief”). In Colorado, 
some courts allow the defendant to collect evidence on damages, such as the evidence used in 
summary judgment motions. Michael J. Hofmann, A Practitioner’s Guide to Removal, 29 COLO. 
LAW., 49, 52 (2000). See also  IOWA R. CIV. P. 70(a) (“[A] pleading shall not state the specific amount 
of money damages sought but shall state whether the amount of damages meets applicable 
jurisdictional requirements for amount in controversy. The specific amount and elements of monetary 
damages sought may be obtained through discovery.”). Moreover, the Iowa Code provides that “[i]n 
an action for personal injury or wrongful death, the amount of money damages demanded shall not be 
stated in the petition, original notice, or any counterclaim or cross-petition.” IOWA CODE § 619.18 
(1998). 
 51. Plaintiffs often try to defeat federal jurisdiction, either by alleging an amount of damages less 
than the jurisdictional minimum or by joining a defendant who is a citizen of the state in which the 
plaintiff brought action. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR. ,  LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY:  FEDERAL 
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA , 1870-1958, 107 (1992). Joinder of a resident 
defendant defeats removal because “[a]ny other such action . . . shall be removable only if none of the 
parties . . . served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(b) (1994). See also  28 U.S.C § 1447(e) (1994) (providing that if the court permits joinder of a 
defendant that  defeats subject matter jurisdiction, the court should “remand the action to the State 
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enough to meet the federal jurisdictional requirement of $75,000.52 
The legislative history of the statutes does not give much guidance to 
practitioners.53 Although, Congress has not completely ignored the statute 
that confers diversity jurisdiction; it has not made many amendments to 
provide clarification since that time.54 
In 1996, Congress clarified part of the removal process when it enacted 
Senate Bill 533. 55 The bill amended § 1447 to allow remand for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction at any time during trial and before final 
judgment.56 This change allows a federal court to remand a case back to the 
state court if at any time the amount in controversy does not meet the 
requisite amount.57 When a court remands a case, the defendant must bear 
the costs that result from a wrongful removal.58  
 
 
court”). 
 52. See generally Noble-Allgire, supra  note 10, at 686-92. See, e.g., Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. 
Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 947 (2000) (stating that the plaintiff alleged damages in her complaint “in excess 
of $15,000”). The alleged amount met the jurisdictional minimum for the state court. Id. 
 53. Although there is not definitive evidence of its intent, Congress created the amount in 
controversy to correspond with the amount that state courts required for jurisdiction. The ambiguity of 
the removal statute was, thus, irrelevant when Congress established the amount in controversy 
requirement. Since then, Congress increased the amount in controversy requirement, but the states 
have left the amount required for state court jurisdiction unchanged. The Senate conceded the misstep 
in the context of class actions. S. REP. NO. 106-420, at 11 (2000).  
 54. The Senate acknowledged the problem of an increased workload in the federal courts. 
Congress increased the amount in controversy requirement in order to improve the situation and 
reduce the number of cases brought into the district courts. S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3 (1958). At the 
same time, the Senate wanted to preserve the venue of federal courts to all “substantial controversies” 
where the other requirements of jurisdiction were fulfilled. Id. at 3-4. For more discussion on 
Congress’s intent to reduce the workload of the federal courts, see infra notes 143-44. 
 55. Act of Oct. 1, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-219, 110 Stat. 3022 § 1 (1996). 
 56. Id. Prior to the amendment, § 1447(c) read: “A motion to remand the case on the basis of any 
defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal 
under § 1446(a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1948).  
 The amended § 1447(c) provides: “A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other 
than lack of subject matter jurisdiction  must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of 
removal under § 1446(a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. II 1996) (emphasis added). See Bailey v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1415, 1416 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (asserting that the 1988 amendments to 
§ 1447 (c) and (e) “clearly overruled” the Supreme Court’s holding in St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. 
and advocated the “primacy of state courts”). The court reasoned that the specific changes to the 
statute’s language demonstrate that a court should remand a case whenever the parties can show a lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1417. 
 57. Congress once again left little legislative history to guide practitioners in the amendment’s 
application. Act of Oct. 1, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-219, 110 Stat. 3022 (1996).  
 58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. II 1996) (“An order remanding the case may require payment 
of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.”). 
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B.  The Effect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
First enacted in 1937,59 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure further guide 
the process of removal.60 Rule 11 governs pleadings and motions to the 
court.61 To remove a case, a defendant must make an “inquiry reasonable 
under the circumstances” for justification.62 The defendant bears the burden 
of demonstrating proper jurisdiction.63 Without such proof, a court must 
follow Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and remand a case back to 
the state court for lack of proper jurisdiction. 64 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), as well as its state court 
counterparts,65 allows a court to grant an award to a plaintiff whether or not 
the plaintiff has requested such relief in the pleadings.66 Because of this rule, 
a plaintiff rarely specifies the amount sought in the pleadings for strategic 
reasons.67 The defendant must establish the amount in controversy on his 
own accord,68 and the plaintiff gets the benefit of a low amount in 
controversy without giving up the possibility of a high award.69 
The discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create 
 
 
 59. Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (1937). 
 60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1994) (“A defendant . . . shall file . . . a notice of removal signed 
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”). 
 61. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. The title of Rule 11(b) is “Representations to Court.” The Rule provides 
that “whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating,” these “representations” explicitly 
include “pleading, written motion, or other paper.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 62. Id. Rule 11(b) requires that an attorney “to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, 
and belief,” make all representations to the court after “an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances.” Id.  
 63. See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939) (“The burden of showing by the admitted facts 
that the federal court has jurisdiction rests upon the complainants.”). But see 14 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3730, at 195 (2d ed. 1984) (stating that the 
defendant’s notice for removal “need only state the grounds for removal, and not the facts supporting 
removal” to follow Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11). 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(1) states that “lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter” is a sufficient reason to dismiss a removed case from federal court. Id. Subject matter 
jurisdiction for federal court requires either federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1994). For a discussion on the requirements of diversity jurisdiction, see supra 
notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
 65. See, e.g., MISS. R. CIV. P. 54(c). 
 66. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c). The Rule provides that except in the case of a default judgment, “every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if 
the party has not demanded such relief in the party’s pleadings.” Id. 
 67. A plaintiff probably will not allege a specific amount of damages and thus render removal 
more difficult. See, e.g., Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 157-58 (6th Cir. 1993).  
 68. See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE , § 107.14[2][g][vi] (3d ed. 
1997) (stating that the defendant bears a “heavy burden” of demonstrating that the plaintiff’s allegation 
of an amount less than the jurisdictional minimum is clearly erroneous). 
 69. The Senate stated the principle clearly: “In tort cases the amount claimed oftentimes bears 
little relation to the actual recovery.” S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 5 (1958).  
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further hardship for defendants seeking removal because the defendant does 
not necessarily receive discovery evidence before the removal deadline.70 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(b)(3) grants a party thirty days to respond 
to an interrogatory71 unless the court directs a different length of time.72 
Similarly, in the case of a request of admission, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 36(a) also gives a party thirty days to respond.73 These thirty-day 
limits match the thirty-day limit for removal.74 Therefore, defendants often 
do not receive information before they must file for removal. 
C. Courts’ Handling of the Amount in Controversy 
1. The Supreme Court’s Foundation 
Some early Supreme Court opinions provided initial guidance on the 
issue of the establishment of the amount in controversy. In McNutt v. 
General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana,75 the Supreme Court stated 
that Congress intended to leave the question of whether an allegation was 
sufficient to establish the amount in controversy “to the discretion of the trial 
judge.”76 The Supreme Court, while reversing the district court, affirmed the 
trial court’s ruling that the burden is on the complainant to establish the facts 
 
 
 70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994) (“The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall 
be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant . . . .”). 
 71. A defendant who serves a plaintiff with an interrogatory may not even receive the answer to 
the interrogatory within thirty days. There is a general consensus that “interrogatories spawn a greater 
percentage of objections and motions that any other discovery device.” FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory 
committee’s note. Objections result in additional response time. Id. See William H. Speck, The Use of 
Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1144 (1951) (stating that parties 
virtually expect to receive responses to interrogatories late). Even though the 1970 amendments added 
sanctions for unjustified objections, the delays did not decrease. FED.  R. CIV.  P. 33 advisory 
committee’s note.  
 72. The Rule provides that if the defendant gives the plaintiff an interrogatory in the hope of 
establishing the requisite amount in controversy, the plaintiff “shall serve a copy of the answers, and 
objections if any, within 30 days after the service of the interrogatories.” FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(3). The 
court may direct, or the parties may agree on, a longer or shorter length of time for response. Id. The 
court does not often interfere in such a manner, and it is unlikely that the plaintiff will voluntarily give 
up such information before the thirty days have elapsed. See Speck, supra  note 71, at 1144. 
 73. Requests of admission are not helpful for defendants to est ablish that the amount in 
controversy surpasses the jurisdictional minimum because of restrictions in the discovery process. 
Rule 36(a) provides that “requests for admission may not be served before the time specified in Rule 
26(d).” FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a). Rule 26(d) cross-references Rule 26(f). FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d). The cross-
reference states that neither party may use a request for admission before the discovery conference. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 74. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1994) (“The notice of removal . . . shall be filed within thirty days 
. . . .”). 
 75. 298 U.S. 178 (1936). 
 76. Id. at 185 (quoting Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 121 (1898)). 
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that confer jurisdiction. 77 Without such facts, a court must dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction. 78  
In St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,79 the Supreme Court 
stated that when a plaintiff brings a case in state court and the case is 
removed, “if, upon the face of the complaint, it is obvious that the suit cannot 
involve the necessary amount, removal will be futile and remand will 
follow.”80 The Court reasoned that without the benefit of discovery the 
plaintiff’s complaint controls the venue.81 The Court further stated that events 
which occur subsequent to removal to reduce the amount in controversy, 
such as an amendment to the pleading that reduces the alleged damages, 
whether in the control of the plaintiff or not, do not destroy federal 
jurisdiction. 82  
2. The Circuits’ Standards 
The Supreme Court left lower courts room for clarification, resulting in 
sharply contrasting approaches between the circuits. More specifically, 
during the past ten years, several circuits examined the use of post-petition 
evidence and developed inconsistent approaches.83 Those circuits allowed 
varied methods to prove the amount in controversy for removal.84  
Some circuits give little weight to the defendants’ interests and apply the 
removal statute strictly.85 In Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,86 the defendant tried to 
remove the action when the plaintiff’s complaint was ambiguous concerning 
the amount in controversy.87 Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) prohibited 
a specific numeric request for damages exceeding $10,000;88 therefore, the 
 
 
 77. Id. at 187. 
 78. Id. 
 79. 303 U.S. 283 (1938). 
 80. Id. at 292. 
 81. Id. at 291. 
 82. Id. at 293. In the different situation when the plaintiff brings the claim in federal court, in 
terms of sum, the complaint controls if made in good faith. Id. at 288. The Supreme Court further 
detailed that dismissal is justified if it appears “to a legal certainty” that the claim is for less than the 
jurisdictional amount. Id. at 289.  
 83. For an examination of the circuits’ approaches, see infra  notes 84-140 and accompanying 
text. 
 84. For a discussion of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ strict approaches, see infra  notes 86-92 and 
accompanying text, and see infra  notes 93-102 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941) (stating that a court should 
strictly construe the removal statutes in favor of remand). 
 86. 980 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 87. Id. at 565. In the complaint, Gaus stated that the damages were “in excess of $10,000” but 
did not state the specific amount sought. Id. 
 88. NEV. R. CIV. P. 8(a). Rule 8 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a] 
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plaintiff simply alleged damages in excess of $10,000 without alleging a 
specific number.89 The Ninth Circuit stated that there is a “strong 
presumption” against removal.90 The court also stated that the defendant 
bears the burden of proving facts that establish the amount in controversy 
when the amount of damages sought is unclear.91 The court held that the case 
did not meet the amount in controversy requirement, and the court denied 
removal because the defendant did not satisfy his burden of proving the 
necessary facts “in the removal petition itself.”92  
Similarly, in Laughlin v. Kmart Corp.,93 the Tenth Circuit held that the 
defendant must “affirmatively establish” the amount in controversy on the 
face of the petition for removal or the removal notice.94 In the defendant’s 
jurisdiction brief,95 the defendant alleged an amount in controversy above the 
minimum jurisdictional requirement.96 However, the court of appeals 
remanded the case back to the district court with instructions to remand the 
case to state court97 because neither the plaintiff’s petition nor the 
defendant’s notice of removal included any allegation of an amount in 
controversy to fulfill the jurisdictional minimum. 98 The court stated that the 
defendant must include the proper facts in the notice of removal.99 The court 
reached this conclusion by asserting the presumption against removal.100 The 
 
 
pleading which sets forth a claim . . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim . . . and 
(2) a demand for judgment . . . . Where a claimant seeks damages of more than $10,000, the demand 
shall be for damages ‘in excess of $10,000’ without further specification of amount.” Id. 
 89. 980 F.2d at 565. 
 90. Id. at 566. 
 91. Id. at 566-67. 
 92. Id. at 567. The defendant alleged only that the amount in “controversy . . . exceed[ed] the 
sum of $50,000.” Id. 
 93. 50 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 94. Id. at 873. The Tenth Circuit cited the U.S. Supreme Court in Ins. Corp. v. Compagnie des 
Bauxites, stating that “[t]he rule . . . is inflexible and without exception, which requires [a] court, of its 
own motion, to deny its jurisdiction, and, in the exercise of its appellate power, that of all other courts 
of the United States, in all cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record .” 
456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)) 
(emphasis added). Notably, the Supreme Court applied this rule in a case where the plaintiff originally 
brought the act ion in federal court. Id. 
 95. 50 F.3d at 873. The defendant’s jurisdictional brief alleged that the amount in controversy 
was “well above” the minimum requirement, which was $50,000 at the time. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 874. 
 98. Id. at 872. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged damages “in excess of $10,000.” Id. The 
defendant’s notice of removal did not allege any amount to satisfy the amount in controversy. Id. The 
defendant simply attached the plaintiff’s complaint to its notice of removal. Id. 
 99. Id. at 873. 
 100. Id. See Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that the court must strictly construe removal jurisdiction and remand a case when the existence 
of federal jurisdiction is in doubt). In Ins. Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, the Supreme Court stated 
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court stated that because parties may not concede jurisdiction,101 the 
defendant has to demonstrate facts on the face of the petition.102  
In contrast to the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, other circuits allow the 
defendant to establish the amount in controversy after removal. In Allen v. R 
& H Oil & Gas Co.,103 the Fifth Circuit held that diversity jurisdiction exists 
when the defendant alleges an amount in controversy above the minimum 
jurisdictional amount.104 The court reasoned that the burden rests on the 
defendant because of the general policy that plaintiffs should control 
jurisdiction. 105 The court stated that the “defendant must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence” the minimum jurisdictional requirement.106 
The court further stated that a defendant may use post-petition evidence to 
establish the jurisdictional requirement for removal.107 The Fifth Circuit, 
therefore, established two situations in which a defendant may remove a case 
to federal court in a diversity case: when the plaintiff alleges the amount in 
controversy in the complaint, or when the defendant proves the existence of 
the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence.108 
The Allen court used a “facially apparent” standard.109 This standard 
requires that the court look at the face of the complaint and decide whether or 
not the amount in controversy “was likely to exceed” the jurisdictional 
amount.110 For removal, the court prefers that the defendant establish the 
amount in controversy with facts in the removal petition,111 but the court also 
permits the defendant to establish those facts in an affidavit.112 
The Seventh Circuit applies a similar standard. In Shaw v. Dow Brands, 
 
 
that the failure to challenge jurisdiction does not necessarily establish jurisdiction, because subject 
matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred or waived. 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). 
 101. 50 F.3d at 874. 
 102. Id. at 873. 
 103. 63 F.3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 104. Id. at 1337. One should note that there were 512 plaintiffs in the case. Id. at 1329. The 
amount in controversy, which was then $50,000, would have been easy to reach because the number of 
plaintiffs was so high and the case consisted of a joint, state-law tort action. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1335. The court claimed that “[o]f course . . . [the plaintiff] generally can bar a 
defendant from removal” by pleading damages of an amount below the jurisdictional minimum. Id. On 
one hand,  when the plaintiff alleges an amount in controversy greater than minimum jurisdictional 
amount, that amount controls if alleged in good faith. Id. at 1335. On the other hand, if a plaintiff 
alleges less than the minimum jurisdictional amount in t he pleadings, he can usually bar a defendant’s 
removal. Id. 
 106. 63 F.3d at 1335 (citing De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 11 F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
 107. 63 F.3d at 1335 (citing Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores a Pequena Escala O Artesanales 
de Colombia v. Dow Quimica de Colombia S.A. (ANPAC), 988 F.2d 559, 565 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
 108. 63 F.3d at 1336. 
 109. Id. at 1336. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1335. 
 112. Id. (citing ANPAC, 988 F.2d at 565).  
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Inc.,113 the Seventh Circuit allowed the defendant’s good faith allegation of 
the requisite amount in the removal petition to establish the amount in 
controversy.114 The plaintiff originally stated that the amount in controversy 
exceeded the minimum jurisdictional requirement,115 but later maintained 
that the amount in controversy did not reach the minimum requirement.116 
The court denied remand because it wanted to prohibit the plaintiff from 
manipulating the court system to keep the case in state court.117  
The Seventh Circuit further defined its approach in Harmon v. OKI 
Systems,118 when it permitted the defendant to establish the amount in 
controversy through the use of answers to interrogatories after removal.119 
The Harmon court granted one of the defendants’ notice of removal on the 
basis of diversity jurisdiction although the defendant did allege neither the 
amount in controversy nor the fact that the parties had complete diversity of 
citizenship. 120 The parties conducted almost two years of discovery, and then 
the plaintiffs sought remand.121 The district court examined the plaintiffs’ 
answers to interrogatories to establish the amount in controversy 
requirement.122 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that a court should 
consider reliable evidence even if it was not in the record at the time of 
removal.123 
Similarly, in Sierminski v. Transouth Financial Corp.,124 the Eleventh 
Circuit held that a court may consider post-petition evidence to establish the 
amount in controversy.125 In the complaint, the plaintiff sought damages for 
an unlawful termination of employment.126 She alleged damages “in excess 
 
 
 113. 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 114. Id. at 366. 
 115. Id. The Illinois statute on pleadings provides that “no ad damnum may be pleaded except to 
the minimum extent necessary to comply with the circuit rules of assignment where the claim is filed.” 
735 ILL. COMP . STAT. 5/2 -604 (1993). In this case the amount that met the circuit rules was $15,000. 
994 F.2d at 366. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 367-68. 
 118. 115 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 119. Id. at 478. The plaintiffs sued the manufacturer and the servicing company of a forklift for 
injuries suffered during use and for loss of consortium. Id. at 477-78. 
 120. Id. at 478.  
 121. Id. The plaintiffs did not seek remand until the defendants scheduled arguments for their 
motion for summary judgment. Id. Moreover, the district court took the case off of the trial calendar 
when it scheduled the arguments for the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Id.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 479–80. The Seventh Circuit elaborated on its position, stating that “[t]he test should 
simply be whether the evidence sheds light on the situation which existed when the case was 
removed.” Id. at 480. 
 124. 216 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 125. Id. at 946. 
 126. Id. at 947. The defendant company conducted automobile loans and mortgages. Id. at 949. 
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of $15,000” to meet the jurisdictional requirement for the state court.127 After 
filing a notice of removal, the defendant provided the court with evidence 
specifying the pla intiff’s salary and benefits.128 The court affirmed removal 
and denied remand because both the defendant’s evidence and the plaintiff’s 
motion for remand provided the court with facts demonstrating that the 
damages exceeded the amount in controversy requirement.129  
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to allow the 
post-petition evidence to establish the amount in controversy requirement.130 
Although the court examined previous holdings of other circuits, including 
Gaus,131 Laughlin,132 Allen,133 and Harmon,134 the Eleventh Circuit dismissed 
Laughlin  as the only case that so harshly restricted the use of post-petition 
evidence.135 The Eleventh Circuit further reasoned that in Gaus,136 the Ninth 
Circuit based its decision on the premise that the defendant “offered no facts 
whatsoever.”137 The court instead relied on Allen138 and Harmon139 as 
justification for its decision.140  
III. ANALYSIS 
The question at the core of the debate becomes whether or not a 
defendant may use evidence established after defendant’s petition for 
removal to prove the amount in controversy in diversity cases.141 There are 
 
 
The plaintiff learned that her immediate supervisor had an expired notary and used an invalid seal or 
failed to notarize specific documents completely. Id. The plaintiff objected to her employer’s illegal 
notary practices and informed various company officers. Id. at 949-50. The plaintiff’s supervisor 
received a demotion and the plaintiff then had the duty of repairing the backlog caused by her former 
supervisor. Id. at 950. The plaintiff had trouble resolving those problems and received several 
reprimands and heavy criticism. Id. The defendant terminated her employment. Id. She alleged that the 
defendant fired her in retaliation and thus violated Florida’s Whistle Blower’s Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 
448.102 (1997). 216 F.3d at 950. 
 127. 216 F.3d at 947. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 949. 
 131. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 132. Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 133. Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995).  
 134. Harmon v. OKI Sys., 115 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 135. Sierminski, 216 F.3d at 948. 
 136. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 564. 
 137. 216 F.3d at 948 (citing Singer v. St ate Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376 
(1997)).  
 138. Allen, 63 F.3d at 1326.  
 139. Harmon, 115 F.3d at 477. 
 140. 216 F.3d at 949 (citing Harmon, 115 F.3d at 477; Allen, 63 F.3d at 1326). 
 141. See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3702, at 
59-60 (3d ed. 1998) (“[A] debate exists as to how much further the district court should 
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three competing interests: (1) the plaintiff should be the master of the 
complaint;142 (2) a defendant should have access to federal courts equal to 
that of a plaintiff;143 and (3) the courts prefer that state law claims go through 
the state court system.144 
The parties’ competing interests become critical because of the thirty-day 
limit on removal. Much of the controversy surrounding potentially 
removable cases derives from the fact that the defendant cannot benefit from 
discovery before the removal deadline.145 The defendant must wrestle with 
issues of time when seeking evidence to affirmatively prove an amount in 
controversy.146 As a result of the thirty-day limit, the defendant probably will 
 
 
investigate . . . .”). Wright gives examples of potential actions the district court could use to determine 
whether or not the action meets the requisite amount in controversy: “requiring additional pretrial 
documents, conducting hearings, or exercising its discretion to request the submission of more 
information.” Id.  
 142. 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3702, at 46 (3d 
ed. 1998). See Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335 (“[I]n the typical diversity case, the plaintiff remains the master 
of his complaint.”). The Supreme Court in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co. even stated 
that a plaintiff may avoid removal by “suing for less than the jurisdictional amount, and though he 
would be justly entitled to more, the defendant cannot remove.” St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red 
Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294 (1938). See also  LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 
104 (1994) (posing the argument for deference to the plaintiff). The argument states that a plaintiff 
should have the freedom to choose state court litigation even if the claim qualifies for the federal 
courts. Id. 
 143. The importance of access to the federal courts lies in the fact that out-of-state defendants may 
suffer prejudice in state courts in front of state juries. The Senate stated this principle: 
To deny the right to resort to the Federal courts means that, in controversies between citizens of 
different states, one must seek justice in the courts of the state of his adversary where he will find, 
in many of the States, that trial by jury has been stripped of many of its safeguards and the judge 
has been denied the common-law powers necessary to the proper administration of justice. 
S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 18 (1958). Furthermore, the use of federal judges allows an additional benefit 
in cases that address controversial or political issues. Federal judges, unlike state judges, have life 
tenure under Article III and need not worry about political motives or the stigma of unpopular 
decisions. Paul E. McGreal, Ambition’s Playground , 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1144 (2000). See 
Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 938 (1991). See also  Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the 
Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561, 619 (2001) (stating that life tenure protects the 
judiciary’s independence). 
 144. See CHEMERINSKY, supra  note 28, at 288 § 5.3.2 (stating the preference that federal courts 
handle federal claims); HOWARD P. FINK & MARK V. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND 
PRACTICE  436 (2d ed. 1987) (summarizing the problem in exhausting federal judicial resources to 
resolve state law claims). But see John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisd iction, 16 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 403, 411 (1979) (posing the idea that there might not be such a phenomenon as a “state case”). 
See also  In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (stating, “[T]he whole subject of domestic relations 
. . . belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 28, at 300 § 5.3.3 (stating that domestic relations cases are barred from federal court and may not 
use diversity jurisdiction). The Supreme Court  later noted “the longstanding tradition of reserving 
domestic relations matters to the States.” Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 186 n.4 (1988). 
 145. For a discussion on why the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow the benefit of 
discovery, see supra  notes 59-74 and accompanying text. 
 146. For a discussion on a defendant’s time limitations, see  supra notes 70-74 and accompanying 
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not have had time to collect any evidence to establish the amount in 
controversy requirement. The discovery process is at odds with the thirty-day 
limit on the removal notice.147 As a result, the defendant cannot rely on the 
use of an interrogatory.148 The defendant usually does not receive the 
necessary evidence because the plaintiff often delays his response so that the 
defendant cannot use such discovery in the petition for removal.149 The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure render removal difficult150 because the 
defendant bears the burden of proof. 
Without evidence before the removal petition, a defendant can only use 
post-petition evidence to establish the amount in controversy. Ambiguous 
statutory language does not reveal whether a court should allow the use of 
post-petition evidence.151 The circuits apply the same statutes in such 
disparate manners that a perfect rule is difficult to attain.152 The circuits give 
extreme deference to either the plaintiff153 or the defendant154 and avoid any 
middle ground. Although the circuits’ various holdings demonstrate that a 
single rule is difficult to establish, they also present many strengths from 
which to craft a new rule. 
Some circuits give extreme deference to the plaintiff’s position as master 
of the complaint. In Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,155 the Ninth Circuit recognized the 
“strong presumption” against removal.156 The court took this strong 
presumption to an extreme. The court held that the defendant did not satisfy 
the burden of supplying facts that supported the contention of the amount in 
controversy.157 Even though the defendant bears the burden of proof, the 
court required too much concrete evidence in the removal petition. 158 The 
 
 
text. 
 147. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)-(c) (1994).  
 148. For a discussion on a defendant’s inability to use an interrogatory to establish the amount in 
controversy, see supra  notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
 149. For a discussion about the delays that follow discovery requests, see supra note 71 and 
accompanying text. 
 150. The defendant must meet a preponderance of the evidence test. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3702, at 49-50 (3d ed. 1998). 
 151. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1994). 
 152. For a discussion of the primary cases that address the issue of admitting post -petition 
evidence to establish the amount in controversy, see supra  notes 84-140 and accompanying text. 
 153. For a discussion of the circuit court cases that apply a stricter standard that favors plaintiffs, 
see supra notes 85-102 and accompanying text. 
 154. For a discussion of the circuit court cases that apply a more lax standard that favors 
defendants, see supra  notes 103-40 and accompanying text. 
 155. 980 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1992).  
 156. Id. at 566 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 157. Id. at 567. 
 158. The Gaus court disallowed the use of the plaintiff’s allegation that the damages were “in the 
millions of dollars.” Id. at 566 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p299 Lastimosa book pages.doc  8/5/2002   5:53 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
316 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:299 
 
 
 
 
court’s opinion prejudiced the defendant’s position too strongly because the 
defendant could not benefit from discovery during the thirty-day limit on 
removal.159 In some cases, without the availability of discovery, the 
defendant will have no information outside of the plaintiff’s pleading, which 
may be amended later and has little effect on the damages that the plaintiff 
can receive in trial.160 
In Laughlin v. Kmart Corp.,161 the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant 
must affirmatively establish the amount in controversy on the removal 
petition. 162 The defendant improperly alleged the amount in controversy by 
proposing facts in its jurisdictional brief only.163 The Laughlin  court 
disagreed with the Shaw court and stated that jurisdiction could not be 
“conceded.”164 The court also stated that the defendant’s economic analysis 
of damages does not establish a factual basis for jurisdiction at the time of 
removal.165 In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit implicitly agreed with the Shaw 
court’s recognition of the importance of the defendant’s allegation in good 
faith that the amount in controversy meet the jurisdictional minimum.166 
When one applies the above analysis to the introductory hypothetical of 
this Note, one realizes the problem in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ 
approach. Their formalistic approach requires affirmative facts to prove the 
amount in controversy at the time of the removal petition. If one applies the 
courts’ approach to the introductory hypothetical, Boxer would not have 
sufficient information to prove the amount in controversy because of the time 
delays associated with discovery. Fairness to the defendant calls for a more 
relaxed approach. 
 
 
 159. For an explanation of why a removing defendant does not get the benefit of the discovery 
process, see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
 160. Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to award damages that it 
sees fit unrestricted by the relief sought in the pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 54.  
 161. 50 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 162. Id. at 873. The court also stated that the facts of jurisdiction may be established on the face of 
the removal notice. Id. 
 163. Id. The defendant simply referred to the removal statute in the removal notice. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441 (1994). As the court noted, the removal statute does not refer to the requisite dollar amount for 
the amount in controversy. 50 F.3d at 873. Section 1441 refers to the “amount in controversy.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1441 (1994). Section 1332 requires the “amount in controversy” to be a value of $75,000 or 
greater, exclusive of interests and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (Supp. II 1996). 
 164. 50 F.3d at 874 (citing Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 367-68 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 165. 50 F.3d at 873. 
 166. The Laughlin court cited the Shaw analysis of the defendant’s petition. Id. at 873-74 (citing 
Shaw, 994 F.2d at 366). Not until the following paragraph in the analysis of “conceded” jurisdiction 
does the Laughlin court disagree with the Shaw court. Id. at 874. By citing various parts of the 
rationale in Shaw and only disagreeing with the final one, the Laughlin  court implicitly agreed with the 
prior lines of reasoning. 
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Other circuits recognize the defendant’s right to access the federal courts 
and a fair forum. In Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co.,167 the Fifth Circuit first 
applied the “facially apparent” doctrine.168 The doctrine is ambiguous and 
leaves almost complete discretion to a court to make initial findings with 
little guidance.169 The Fifth Circuit also allowed the use of post-petition 
affidavits.170 However, post-petition affidavits should not have any bearing 
on the amount in controversy.171 
The Fifth Circuit’s approach reduces the importance of the notice for 
removal by allowing the use of all other evidence. A court should not treat 
the notice for removal lightly, however, because the notice is one of the only 
procedural requirements of removal.172 Without notice, removal would add 
multiple steps to an already overburdened process. In the context of 
establishing diversity jurisdiction, the courts often strictly read the notice 
requirement.173 Even though the use of post-petition evidence is important to 
keep the case in federal court, many superficial claims will bog down the 
court simply as a delay tactic by the defendant174 or as a method to avoid the 
 
 
 167. 63 F.3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 168. Id. at  1336. The “facially apparent” doctrine has the district court “look only at the face of the 
complaint and ask whether the amount in controversy . . . [is] likely to exceed [the jurisdictional 
requirement].” Id. The court further stated that “no post-petit ion amendment of the complaint [could] 
divest the district court of jurisdiction.” Id. at 1337. 
 169. Under the “facially apparent” standard, the court examines the face of the complaint to see 
“if the amount in controversy [is] likely to exceed [the jurisdictional amount].” Id. at 1336 (emphasis 
added). The Fifth Circuit admitted that there are no explicit guidelines as to what types of proof the 
court should use under the standard. Id. at 1335. 
 170. Id. at 1335. 
 171. See Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 871-72 (6th Cir. 2000); Chase v. Shop ‘N 
Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 429-30 (7th Cir. 1997); Angus v. Shiley, Inc., 989 F.2d 
142, 146 (3d Cir. 1993); De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 11 F.3d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1993).  
 172. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1994) (“A defendant . . . desiring to remove . . . shall file . . . a 
notice of removal . . . together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such 
defendant or defendants in such action.”). See also  Resolution Trust Corp. v. Nernberg, 3 F.3d 62, 69 
(3d Cir. 1993) (“The requirement of notice to the state court is an important part of the removal 
process . . . .”); Stephens v. Portal Boat Co., 781 F.2d 481, 482 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that 
removal is ineffective without notice to the state court); 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE  § 3737 (3d ed. 1998). 
 173. See Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S 100, 108-09 (1941) (stating that the courts should 
construe the removal statutes strictly in favor of remand). In the case of removal based on diversity 
jurisdiction, the petition “must allege facts from which the court may determine” the citizenship of the 
parties for diversity jurisdiction. 32 AM.  JUR.  2D Federal Practice & Procedure § 498 (emphasis 
added). 
 174. See PURCELL, supra note 51, at 49-50 (summarizing the reasons that delays usually benefit 
the defendant). Defendants can typically outlast the plaintiffs because they hold the funds at issue. Id. 
at 49. During the delay, evidence could disappear, memories could fade, and witnesses could even die. 
Id. Most importantly, poor plaintiffs in dire need of money might agree to lower settlement offers. Id. 
at 49-50. For those reasons, defense counsel oppose settlements and quick proceedings in personal 
injury cases, for example. Id. at 49. The longer the delay continues, the more the plaintiff must sustain 
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expiration of the thirty-day time limit on removal.175 
When one applies the Fifth Circuit’s approach to the introductory 
hypothetical, one begins to anticipate the potential for widely disparate 
treatments of the same situation. By applying the “facially apparent” 
standard, the final forum of a case depends primarily on the court’s senses as 
to what case will “likely exceed” the amount in controversy. In the 
hypothetical, on one hand, Boxer must heed to a court’s findings, which does 
not rely on any firm evidence. On the other hand, if the court hearing Boxer’s 
case allows discovery, there is no indication as to the extent of discovery the 
court should direct or allow. In this situation, Paul must litigate his claim 
against Boxer in federal court indefinitely, regardless of the amount in 
controversy. 
In Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc.,176 the Seventh Circuit granted more 
leniency to the defendant. The court allowed the defendant to assert a good 
faith belief in the petition for removal to establish the amount in 
controversy,177 taking into account the defendant’s interests and foiling the 
plaintiff’s attempt to manipulate the choice of venue.178 The particular case 
facts, however, do not establish a firm rule that one can apply in other 
situations. The plaintiff originally alleged an amount in controversy in excess 
of $50,000, the minimum jurisdictional requirement at the time.179 In its 
opinion, the court avoided any generalization on the types of evidence that a 
court may consider to establish the amount in controversy requirement.180 
 
 
in-court fees, expert testimony costs, and living expenditures. See also  REGINALD HEBER SMITH, 
JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL OF JUSTICE TO THE POOR AND OF THE 
AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION BEFORE THE LAW WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE 
TO LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (3d ed. 1924) (stating that defendants’ and their 
liability insurance companies’ systematic use of delay is common knowledge); PURCELL, supra note 
51, at 27 (stating that removal allows corporate defendants to “exploit their social and economic power 
when confronting relatively weak individual litigants”). 
 175. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994) (“The notice of removal . . . shall be filed within thirty 
days.”). See, e.g., Rollwitz v. Burlington N. R.R., 507 F. Supp. 582, 585 (D. Mont. 1981) (stating that 
the defendant filed notice of removal even though jurisdiction was not yet definite so as to defeat the 
thirty-day limit). 
 176. 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 177. Id. at 366. 
 178. Id. at 368. 
 179. Id. at 366. See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3702, at 44 (3d ed. 1998) (stating that the defendant bears only a light burden when the plaintiff 
claims a sum in excess of the jurisdictional amount). See also  St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab 
Co., 303 U.S. 283, 290 (allowing removal when the plaintiff originally pleaded damages in excess of 
the amount in controversy requirement). 
 180. 994 F.2d at 367. The Seventh Circuit avoided creating any concrete rule. Judge Cummings 
stated that the court “need not decide whether such cases as a general matter should be remanded . . . 
because in this instance Shaw has already conceded that his claim is worth more than $50,000[,]” 
which was the requisite amount in controversy at the time. Id. 
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In Harmon v. OKI Systems,181 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s use of answers to interrogatories after removal to establish the 
amount in controversy.182 One of the defendants filed a notice of removal on 
the basis of diversity jurisdiction, but did not allege an amount in 
controversy.183 The parties conducted almost two years of discovery.184 Only 
after the plaintiffs realized the strong possibility of loss without trial did they 
seek remand.185 Although the court of appeals stated that a court should 
consider reliable evidence after the petition for removal, the court’s opinion 
did not closely examine the issue of post-removal evidence.186 The court’s 
rationale strongly relied on the fact that the plaintiff waited two years before 
seeking remand.187  
In Sierminski v. Transouth Financial Corp.,188 the Eleventh Circuit 
allowed all post-petition evidence that the defendant presented to help the 
court determine the amount in controversy.189 The Eleventh Circuit 
attempted to distinguish the facts of this case from the fact-based holdings of 
other circuits, but its analysis was incomplete. The Eleventh Circuit 
dismissed the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Laughlin190 as the only case with 
“such a restrictive approach.”191 The Eleventh Circuit stated that the Ninth 
Circuit in Gaus reasoned that the defendant offered “no facts whatsoever.”192 
However, the Eleventh Circuit ignored the fact that the plaintiff in Gaus 
alleged that the damages were “in the millions of dollars.”193 The Eleventh 
Circuit admitted that a court should consider all evidence to establish the 
amount in controversy,194 but failed to include such facts in its analysis of 
Gaus.195 
 
 
 181. 115 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 182. Id. at 479. 
 183. Id. at 478. The court of appeals admitted that the removal notice “was no model to emulate” 
with respect to its composition. Id. 
 184. Id. at 478. 
 185. Id. In fact, the district court had taken the case off of the trial calendar when it scheduled the 
arguments for the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Id.  
 186. See id . The Harmon court did not cite any precedent cases or principles to support its 
amount-in-controversy requirement. Id. 
 187. See id. at 479-80 (stating as its final point in its removal argument that “the Harmons were 
trying to forum shop”). 
 188. 216 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 189. Id. at 949. 
 190. Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 1995). For a more detailed discussion of the 
case facts, see supra  notes 78-86. 
 191. 216 F.3d at 948. 
 192. Id. at 948. 
 193. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 194. 216 F.3d at 949. 
 195. Id. at 948. 
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This most recent standard for the use of post-petition evidence is too 
deferential to the defendant, granting excessive leeway. Allowing the 
defendant to use post-petition evidence to establish the amount in 
controversy gives the defendant too much freedom to control the venue.196 
This allowance also leaves the plaintiff helpless to influence the venue of his 
action.197 
When one applies the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to the hypothetical, 
one recognizes the problem of not having a single explicit rule for the courts 
to apply. By considering post-petition evidence, the court is, in effect, 
executing the litigation in federal court longer than necessary. Even when the 
amount in controversy does not exceed the jurisdictional minimum, the 
plaintiff must endure the cost, inconvenience, and delay of the federal courts. 
The preference that state claims remain in state court also deserves 
examination.198 When appropriate, the courts favor a remand to state court,199 
either because state law applies,200 or because state juries should serve as fact 
finders.201 In addition, critics contend that the courts should not exhaust 
 
 
 196. Corporate defendants, the most common defendant in diversity actions, have a particular 
preference for federal courts. PURCELL , supra  note 51, at 23. Part of this preference results from the 
appearance of prestige. Id. Federal courts in larger cities also bring convenience to corporate attorneys. 
Id. Corporate attorneys’ control of venue is particularly important because they are able to select from 
among different judges, favoring one judge more than another. Id. at 26.  
 197. The defendant allegedly wronged the plaintiff before the complaint. However, even after the 
complaint, the defendant continues to steal away the plaintiff’s power. 
 198. During the years previous to one of the amendments that increased the amount in controversy 
requirement (1955-1956), diversity jurisdiction cases consisted of more than one-third of all civil cases 
brought in federal court. S. REP . NO. 85-1830, at 13 (1958). Congress reinforced this preference for 
actions in the state courts. Section 1445 of Title 28 provides that defendants may not remove certain 
state actions to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (Supp. II 1996). These include: act ions against a 
railroad company, actions that arise under worker’s compensation, and actions that derive from the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994. Id. The most serious reform groups agree that courts should 
reduce the federal caseload by leaving state law claims in state courts. YACKLE, supra note 142, at 47. 
 199. See JAMES HAMILTON LEWIS,  REMOVAL OF CAUSES 131 § 35 (1923) (stating that federal 
jurisdiction must be certain and that “a doubt as to the jurisdiction is sufficient ground for remanding a 
removed case to the State court from which it has been removed”). 
 200. See Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 62 A.B.A. 
J. 443, 444 (1976) (stating that state judges better handle state cases under state law); Diversity 
Jurisdiction, Multi-Party Litigation, Choice of Law in the Federal Courts: Hearings on S. 1876 Before 
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 114 
(1971) (statement of Orison S. Marden, Attorney, White & Case, New York, NY). The increases in the 
amount in controversy requirement have the primary goal of reducing diversity jurisdiction cases “by 
eliminating the filing of cases which concern controversies purely local in nature.” S. REP. NO. 85-
1830, at 12 (1958). 
 201. S. REP. NO. 106-420, at 11 (2000). This policy does not apply to class action lawsuits. In 
class actions, the amount in controversy is so large, often in the millions of dollars, that state juries, 
who might be swayed by bias against large corporations, or even the sympathy of a large group of 
plaintiffs, should not decide the case. Id. The federal courts should not take on such cases. See S. 353, 
106th Cong. § 1 (2000).  
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federal funds and resources to settle state claims.202 The number of federal 
trials has become increasingly unwieldy, primarily because of diversity 
jurisdiction cases.203 Public policy mandates a limit on the increase of federal 
judges without a decrease in the quality of justice.204 
IV. PROPOSAL 
The removal doctrine should balance the many competing interests. 
Plaintiffs have interests in controlling the action and choosing the forum in 
which it takes place.205 Defendants have an opposing interest in obtaining a 
fair and equitable trial.206 Balancing the interests is a difficult task.207 The 
 
 
 202. See supra note 144. See also  Yackle, supra note 142, at 47. One can attribute much of the 
federal court backlog to state claims. See id . In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee reported 
that diversity jurisdiction cases accounted for ten percent of federal court expenses and comprised one-
fourth of district court cases and one-half of the civil trials. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, FED.  COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURT STUDY COMMITTEE 38-39 
(1990). Diversity cases previously exhausted federal judicial resources as well. After World War II, 
the number of civil case filings increased seventy-five percent. S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 2-3 (1958). 
The increase in diversity jurisdiction cases accounted for most of the increase in filings. Id. For 
example, the number of diversity cases was 7,286 in 1941 and increased to 20,524 in 1956. Id. at 3. 
See Burger, supra note 200, at 444 (stating that in 1976, “diversity cases represent[ed] one fourth of 
the civ il cases in district courts”). Chief Justice Burger further stated that the cases would bring a 
lesser burden on the four thousand state judges than on the four hundred federal judges that existed 
then. Id. Many legal experts, including former Carter admin istration Attorney General Griffin Bell and 
former Clinton administration Solicitor General Walter E. Dellinger, agree that interstate class actions 
are one of the categories of state-claim cases that most warrant the use of federal courts. S. REP. NO. 
106-420, at 15 (2000). The rationale is that interstate class actions affect the interests of the most 
people, have the largest amount of money at stake, and implicate interstate commerce to the greatest 
degree. Id. 
 203. Randall Samborn, ‘Nightmarish’ Future?: Judges Foresee Federal Courts Caseload Crush, 
NAT’L L.J., Jan. 9, 1995, at A26; id. at A1. In 1993, the Proposed Long Range Plan for Federal Courts 
stated that “if the courts’ civil and criminal jurisdiction continues to grow at the same rate it did over 
the past 53 years, the picture in 2020 can only be described as nightmarish.” at A1. The committee 
projected the filing of more than 1 million cases in 2020. Id. The projected number of cases dwarfs the 
281,740 cases filed in the year ending June 30, 1994. Id. The committee projected 2,766 district judges 
in 2020 when only 649 presided in 1995. Id. 
 204. The Judicial Conference stated in a 1993 report that there should be a limit on the increase in 
number of federal judges. Id. at A26. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky expressed doubts that parties will 
obtain justice with the high number of cases without doubling or tripling the number of federal judges. 
Id. But see YACKLE, supra  note 142, at 96 (arguing that an increase in the number of federal 
judgeships will not reduce the prestige of the federal judiciary). 
 205. For a discussion of the plaintiff’s interests as master of the complaint, see  supra  note 142 and 
accompanying text. 
 206. The Senate stressed the fact  that “[t]he underlying purpose of diversity of citizenship 
legislation . . . is to provide a separate forum for out-of-state citizens against the prejudices of local 
courts and local juries by making available to them the benefits and safeguards of the Federal courts.” 
S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4 (1958). Some theorize that in modern American society there is no longer 
the prejudice in the courts against parties from outside of the state, but the vast majority of expert 
opinion agrees that prejudice continues to exist. Id. at 17. The Framers of the Constitution felt 
similarly. Judge Henry Friendly quoted James Madison to state that “strong prejudice may arise in 
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application of the circuits’ approaches to the introductory hypothetical 
demonstrates that difficulty.208 
The removal statute does not give sufficient details about the process a 
defendant must go through to remove a case to federal court.209 Public policy 
demonstrates that a defendant should have access to federal courts equal to 
that of a plaintiff.210 The risk of prejudice against a defendant in the 
plaintiff’s home state is extensive.211 When the amount in controversy is in 
excess of the minimum, $75,000, the potential award by a court in the 
plaintiff’s home state is significant.212 The plaintiff remains master of the 
action unless the defendant can meet the burden of establishing the amount in 
controversy.213 
 
 
some states against the citizens of others, who may have claims against them.” H. J. Friendly, The 
Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction , 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 493 (1928). One should note that 
another one of the original purposes for creating diversity jurisdiction in 1789 was “to enhance the 
awareness of the people of the existence of the new and originally weak central government.” 
Diversity Jurisdiction, Multi-Party Litigation, Choice of Law in the Federal Courts: Hearings on S. 
1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d 
Cong. 103 (1971) (statement by Sen. Burdick). 
 207. The Supreme Court applied a balancing test that fulfills the requirements of due process. See 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (stating that the court should weigh the private 
interest, the risk of deprivation to that interest, and the government’s interests). Although the Supreme 
Court applied the test in the removal of “bad faith” workers’ compensation claims cases, the test is 
relevant here.  
 First, the Court recognized the private interest of a defendant. Id. at 335. Second, the Court 
examined the “risk of an erroneous deprivation” through the procedure of a federal court. Id. Third, the 
Court considered the government’s interest in the additional burdens that the procedure would entail. 
Id.  
 Furthermore, the federal government has the right to adjudicate disputes between the states and 
between the citizens of those states. Edward John Main, Removal, Remand, and Review of “Bad 
Faith” Workers’ Compensation Claims,  13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 121, 135 (1996). A defendant 
should not suffer the prejudice of another state’s jury. Id. at 136. 
 208. For a discussion of the circuits’ approaches to the introductory hypothetical, see supra Part 
III. 
 209. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1994). 
 210. The American Bar Association organized an extreme amount of support for diversity 
jurisdiction because of corporate defendants. PURCELL, supra  note 51, at 242. See Limiting 
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives, 72d Cong. 65 (1932) (statement of Washington Bowie, Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Baltimore). See also id. at 45 (statement of James A. Emery, general counsel of the National 
Association of Manufacturers). Furthermore, the federal system should not allow or encourage the 
plaintiff’s abuse of the court system. Gordon D. Polozola, Note, The Battle of Removal—Is Delay the 
Ultimate Weapon?: A Note on Martine v. National Tea Company, 54 LOUISIANA L. REV. 1419, 1420 
(1994). 
 211. See John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, supra  note 144, at 406 (stating that 
Congress created diversity jurisdiction because of the fear of prejudice against out-of-state businesses). 
 212. 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE ’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102.106[6][a] (3d ed. 1999). 
A verdict that includes attorney’s fees, which do not contribute to minimum jurisdictional requirement, 
might reach a high amount in excess of the amount in controversy. Id. 
 213. For more discussion of the plaintiff as master of the complaint, see supra note 142 and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/5
p299 Lastimosa book pages.doc  8/5/2002   5:53 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] AUTOMATIC REMOVAL 323 
 
 
 
 
A court should not consider evidence that a defendant does not allege at 
the filing of notice for removal.214 At the same time, a court should not 
require the defendant to prove the amount in controversy when no discovery 
evidence is available.215 When the plaintiff makes an ambiguous pleading 
that is outside of the defendant’s control, the defendant must suffer the 
penalty of costs for removing in good faith. 216 Thus, the defendant’s 
allegation in good faith should be sufficient to establish the amount in 
controversy.217 At any time, if the court finds that firm evidence does not 
prove the amount in controversy, the court may remand the case back to the 
state.218 In addition, frivolous claims of meeting the amount in controversy 
requirement are unlikely to result because the court may apply sanctions 
authorized by Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.219 The 
plaintiff’s pleading gives the defendant sufficient facts to allege the 
jurisdictional amount in the petition in good faith. Fairness to both the 
plaintiff and the defendant justify the “good faith” requirement.220 This 
requirement renders moot the fact that a plaintiff typically answers a 
discovery request after the deadline for the notice of removal.  
In addition, the good faith requirement would help prevent an additional 
 
 
accompanying text. 
 214. See Biggs Corp. v. Wilen, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1046-47 (D. Nev. 2000) (discussing the fact 
that a court may not consider evidence that does not fall under the strict statutory allowances of 
§ 1446). The plaintiff’s demand letter did not qualify as “other paper” under § 1446, because it was not 
part of the official record of the court. Id. at 1047. 
 215. As a policy matter, the requirement of discovery evidence will result in increased costs and 
delays for the parties as well as in the federal court system. For further discussion of the problem 
associated with increased costs and delays, see supra  note 174. 
 216. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. II 1996) (“An order remanding the case may require payment 
of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.”). 
 217. The Senate stated what it believed to be an obvious application after one of the earliest 
amendments to the amount in controversy requirement, that “the court will undoubtedly take into 
consideration whether the amount claimed was made in good faith  or whether it was made simply to 
get into Federal court.” S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 5 (1958) (emphasis added). 
 218. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1994). 
 219. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. If the representations to the court in the form of a petition for removal do 
not meet the burden established by Rule 11(b), “the court may . . . impose an appropriate sanction 
upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). Rule 11(b)(1) lists improper purposes 
for the removal petition, such as to delay and to increase costs. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1). 
 220. The “good faith” requirement matches the provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). Rule 11 provides that representations to the court should be “formed 
after an inquiry reasonable to the circumstances.” Id. According to the Advisory Committee Notes, the 
“good faith” requirement forces parties to “stop-and-think” when they make representations to the 
court. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) advisory committee’s notes. The removing defendant does not have to 
worry about what the Advisory Committee calls “empty-head pure-heart” justification. Id. Although 
the defendant will not have the luxury of a specific amount in controversy pleading by the plaintiff, the 
defendant will have access to the facts alleged in the complaint. These facts should allow for a 
sufficient foundation for the defendant’s good fait h allegation. 
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backlog in the federal court system. The number of unsubstantiated petitions 
claiming the amount in controversy would decrease because of the explicit 
alleging requirement.221 The good faith requirement would discourage 
superficial petitions because of the possibility of sanctions.222 
For the above reasons, this Note urges Congress to add a paragraph to 
§ 1446(b) of Title 28 that reads:  
If the pleadings allege damages in an amount less than the amount in 
controversy conferred by § 1332 of this title or do not allege any 
specific amount, the defendant must file a notice of removal within the 
thirty-day period set forth above. The notice must allege in good faith 
that the amount in controversy of the action exceeds the statutory 
requirement conferred by § 1332 of this title.223 
V. CONCLUSION 
The proposed amendment to the removal statute reconciles the competing 
interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the court system. The plaintiff 
remains master of the action, because the defendant bears the burden of 
establishing the amount in controversy. At the same time, the defendant need 
not rely on discovery evidence, only alleging the amount in controversy in 
 
 
 221. Moreover, defendants would heavily consider the value of the removal motion because 
§ 1447 provides that the defendant might make “payment of just costs and any actual expenses, 
including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. II 1996). See 
Karns, supra  note 50, at 1096 n.34. 
 222. Rule 11(c) provides for sanctions against parties for a violation of Rule 11(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 
11(c). A party violates Rule 11(b) “by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating [for an] improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 223. This proposal differs in language and focus from Noble-Allgire’s proposal. See Noble-
Allgire, supra note 10, at 750-51. Both proposals favor the good faith requirement in the defendant’s 
notice of removal, but this proposal goes a step further. The language of this proposal establishes an 
important distinction in that this proposal of the amended statute requires an explicit allegation of the 
amount in controversy in good faith. Noble-Allgire’s proposal simply requires a removal notice filed 
with a good faith belief. Id. at 750-51. Without an explicit allegation, a defendant fails to meet any 
burden of proof. 
 In addition, Noble-Allgire’s proposal for an amended statute includes a provision that explicitly 
lists the required dollar amount needed to fulfill the amount in controversy requirement, in this case 
$75,000. Id. at 750-51. The problem with that provision is that it takes authority away from 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1332 and 1441, and renders them repetitive. Section 1446(b) refers to the procedure for a case that 
is removable. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994). Section 1441 defines a removable action as an action in 
which “the district courts have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994). Section 1332 defines 
original jurisdiction and more specifically defines diversity jurisdiction. Within that definition, the 
statute lists the amount in controversy requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (Supp. II 1996). Attempting to 
clarify, Noble-Allgire proposes an oversimplification that deconstructs the statutory organization of 
the removal statute. 
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good faith. In addition, the court system has safety measures in place to 
prevent frivolous petitions for removal. More importantly, the proposed 
amendment clarifies the proper approach for the courts to establish the 
amount in controversy in a diversity case when the plaintiff pleads damages 
of an unspecified amount. The explicit language of the proposed amendment 
directs a court’s application of the removal statute and would allow the 
circuit to apply a uniform and fair rule to the cases before them.  
C. Kinnier Lastimosa* 
 
 
 * B.A. (1998), Northwestern University; J.D. (2002), Washington University School of Law.  
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